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CHAPTER 5 
Article Four: Bank Deposits and Collections 
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND 
§5.1. Revisions and repeals generally. The Massachusetts Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, in their Report on the Code to 
the General Court of the Commonwealth in December 1956, wrote: 
Article 4 - Bank Deposits and Collections: The number of 
"items" handled by banks as a part of the bank collection process 
has, since 1900, grown to tremendous proportions. It has been 
estimated that throughout the entire country banks handle not 
less than 25,000,000 items every business day. This tremendous 
volume, moving with surprising speed and efficiency from one 
bank to another, within single cities and towns and between cities 
and towns and over state boundary lines, has built up since 1900 
its own specialized body of laws applicable to the bank collection 
process. The Code recognizes this fact and allocates a separate 
article to the subject entitled "Bank Deposits and Collections." 
Of course in earlier recognition of this development of a special 
law of bank collections the American Bankers Association pro-
mulgated in 1929 a Bank Collection Code, which Code was en-
acted in approximately eighteen states between 1929 and 1933. 
However, due to certain decisions in the United States Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Court of Illinois, the effectiveness of this 
Code was restricted with the result that since the early thirties 
only one state, Oklahoma, in 1937, and one territory, Alaska, in 
1951, has enacted the Bank Collection Code. Thus for a period 
of more than twenty years the ABA Bank Collection Code has 
not proved to be the popular medium for obtaining uniformity 
in the bank collection area, with the result that there is presently 
a distinct need for an up-to-date statute designed to produce this 
result. Article 4 of the Code fills this particular need.! 
Massachusetts had never adopted the ABA Bank Collection Code; 
Article 4 thus breaks much new ground in this Commonwealth. Sec-
tion 2 of Chapter 765, Acts of 1957, repeals G.L., c. 107, § 53, "Lia-
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§5.1. ! House No. 130 (1957), p. II. 
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bility of Banks to Depositor for Non-Payment of Checks." J It also 
repeals G.L., c. 107, § 55, "Presentment for Payment, Conditional 
Credit, Payment, etc., of and for Checks and Other Demand Instru-
ments Payable By, At or Through Banks." 3 
No good purpose would be here served by attempting to duplicate 
the official comments of the Law Institute and Conference of Com-
missioners on the several sections of Article 4. These comments, taken 
together, form a concise text on the law and custom of banking in the 
United States. In this ANNUAL SURVEY there is room only for men-
tion of some of the high spots. 
§5.2. Variation by agreement; Measure of damages; Certain action 
constituting ordinary care. The new customer of a bank commonly 
finds that on signature cards, pass books, deposit slips and the like, 
delivered to him when he begins his relation with the bank and at 
later times, are printed statements defining various aspects of the 
obligation of the bank toward the customer. The customer, by doing 
business with the bank on the basis of such documents, might be con-
sidered to have accepted all their terms. Section 4-103 of the Code 
attempts to define the extent to which contractual provisions so ar-
ranged can limit a customer's rights or a bank's responsibility. Follow-
ing a general statement that the provisions of Article 4 may be varied 
by agreement, there is in Subsection 1 a stated exception providing 
"that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its own 
lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can limit 
the measure of damages for such lack or failure ... " 1 The parties 
are, however, allowed to agree on "standards by which such responsi-
bility is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreason-
able." 2 Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters, clearing 
house rules, and the like are given the effect of such agreements; action 
pursuant to Federal Reserve regulations and operating letters con-
stitutes ordinary care. Action or non-action consistent with clearing 
house rules or with a general banking usage not disapproved by 
Article 4 constitutes prima facie the exercise of ordinary care. Under 
Section 4-103 (5) the customer's measure of damages for the bank's 
failure to exercise ordinary care in handling an item "is the amount 
of the item reduced by an amount which could not have been realized 
by the use of ordinary care, and where there is bad faith it in-
cludes other damages, if any suffered by the party as a proximate 
consequence." 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court dealt with a case involving such a 
2 See ucc §4·402, "Bank's Liability to Customer for Wrongful Dishonor:' 
3 See UCC §4-30I, "Deferred Posting; Recovery of Payment by Return of I,tems; 
Time of Dishonor," and §4-302. "Payor Bank's Responsibility for Late Return of 
Item." 
§5.2. 1 UCC §4-103 (1). 
2 Ibid. 
3 ucc §4-103(5). 
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clause in a "bank book" on November 15, 1956.4 The plaintiff, Ruth 
Polonsky, brought an action against the defendant Union Federal 
Savings and Loan Association for the amount of a deposit which her 
husband had made in a joint account in the name of Ruth Polonsky 
and himself. At the time the account was thus opened, the teller 
had handed to the husband a bank book, on the inside cover of which 
there was printed: "This association shall not be held responsible 
for money paid out to any persons unlawfully presenting this book." I) 
There was no evidence that any of this printed matter ever came to 
the attention either of the plaintiff or her husband. An impostor 
presented the book and a withdrawal slip on which the plaintiff's 
name had been forged, and so obtained the amount of the joint 
account from the defendant association. In the action by Ruth 
Polonsky, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the provision in the 
depositor's pass book, exculpating the association, was binding upon 
the plaintiff. The Court stated that the bank book constituted part 
of the contract by which the parties were bound and that the situa-
tion was different from that in Kergald v. Armstrong Transfer Express 
Co.6 where the item received, a baggage check, did not "purport to 
be a contract." There was no evidence that the defendant association 
was negligent or that it acted in bad faith. 
The Polonsky case is thus in accord with the policy of Section 4-103 
of the Code. One might ask whether the defendant Union Federal 
Savings and Loan Association would in any event be a "bank" within 
the provisions of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
Code does not seem clearly to solve this problem; Section 1-201 (4) 
defines "banker" as "any person engaged in the business of banking," 
which seems to describe a federal savings and loan association. Per-
haps the question is not very important under the circumstances of 
the present case, where the Supreme Judicial Court has arrived, on 
general principles, at the same position laid down in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
§5.3. Separate office of a bank. For the purpose of computing 
the time within which, and determining the place at or to which 
action may be taken or notices or orders shall be given under Article 
4, a branch or separate office of a bank is treated as a separate bank.1 
Thus a stop order should be directed to the branch where the cus-
tomer's account is maintained; and the effectiveness of a stop order 
as to time under Section 4-303 is determined by the time when such a 
branch receives the stop order and has a reasonable time to act on it. 
§5.4. Final payment. In modern banking practice only a very 
small percentage of the total number of transactions is carried out by 
4 Polonsky v. Union Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 334 Mass. 697, 138 N.E.2d 
115 (1956). 
D 334 Mass. at 698,138 N.E.2d at 116. 
6330 Mass. 254, 113 N.E.2d 53 (1953). 
§5.3. 1 UCC §4-106. 
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an exchange of actual currency. "Payment" is a matter of bookkeeping; 
checks or other negotiable instruments passed to and fro among banks 
and business houses are essentially directions to make changes in the 
books. The process by which a check goes through a bank is a com-
plicated one, and to determine when an item should be considered 
"paid" is difficult. This question is important in the law for many 
reasons. Two sections of the Code notably treat of this subject: Sec-
tion 4-213, "Final Payment of Item by Payor Bank; When Pro-
visional Debits and Credits Become Final; When Certain Credits 
Become Available for Withdrawal"; and Section 4-303, "When Items 
Subject to Notice, Stop-Order, Legal Process or Set-off; Order In 
Which Items may be Charged or Certified." 
"Final payment" by a payor bank is accomplished under Section 
4-213 either by the comparatively rare procedure of payment in cash; 
or by settlement for the item without reserving right to revoke or 
otherwise having such a right; or by making a provisional settlement 
for the item and then failing to revoke it in any manner and within 
any time permitted by agreement, clearing house, rule or statute or 
by having "completed the process of posting the item to the in-
dicated account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged 
therewith ... " 1 
Similarly, knowledge, notice or stop order, or legal process, or set-off 
comes too late after the bank has accepted or certified the item, or 
paid it in cash, or settled for the item without having a right to 
revoke either by reservation or by statute, clearing house, rule or agree-
ment; or become accountable for the item under Section 4-213 (1) (d); 
or has retained the item beyond the permitted time; 2 or has "com-
pleted the process of posting the item to the indicated account of 
the drawer, maker, or other person to be charged therewith or other-
wise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by 
action its decision to pay the item ... " 3 
§5.5. "Security interest of collecting bank in items." A case de-
cided by the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts on December 14, 1956,1 raises a question to which Section 
4-208, "Security Interest of Collecting Bank in Items, Accompanying 
Documents and Proceeds," seems relevant. This was an action of 
interpleader in which an insurance company paid into court $4000, 
the amount of a draft issued by it in payment of a fire insurance 
claim. The United States intervened, claiming the full amount under 
a tax lien against the insured, one Andrade. Andrade had deposited 
the draft in the Fall River Trust Company which had given him 
credit and had permitted him to make withdrawals against the credit. 
§5.4. 1 UCC §4-213(1) (c). 
2 UCC §4-302. 
sId. §4-303(d). 
§5.5. 1 Agricultural Insurance Co. of Watertown, N.Y. v. Andrade, 146 F. Supp. 
893 (D Mass. 1956). 
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The District Court held that as the draft was received by the bank 
for collection only, the bank was an agent of the payee, Andrade, and 
was not a holder even though it permitted the payee Andrade to 
draw against the draft,2 and that the bank was therefore not entitled 
to the proceeds as against the United States. The court in arriving at 
this conclusion relied on the terms of the contract of deposit, set forth 
in the deposit slip and otherwise expressed between the parties; it 
included the following clause: "This bank acts only as depositor's 
collecting agent and assumes no responsibility beyond its exercise of 
due care. All items are credited subject to final payment and to 
receipt of proceeds of final payment in cash or solvent credits by this 
Bank at its own office." 3 The District Court suggests that had the 
bank become a holder in due course, it would have had a better right 
to the proceeds of the draft than the government had under its tax 
lien; but as the bank was not a holder, but merely the agent of the 
payee, the government was entitled to the entire fund. 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code the opposite result would 
apparently be indicated. Under Section 4-201, called "Presumption 
and Duration of Agency Status of Collecting Banks ... ,OJ the Fall 
River Trust Company would have continued to be the agent of 
Andrade, "but the continuance of ownership of an item by its owner 
and any rights of the owner to proceeds of the item are subject to 
rights of a collecting bank such as those resulting from outstanding 
advances on the item and valid rights of set-off."" Under Section 
4-208, "Security Interest of Collecting Bank ... ," the Fall River Trust 
Company would have had a security interest in the draft under two 
subsections, Subsection I (a), "to the extent to which credit given for 
the item has been withdrawn," and also (b) "in case of an item for 
which it has given credit available for withdrawal as of right, to the 
extent of the credit given whether or not the credit is drawn upon 
and whether or not there is a right of charge-back ... " (I 
Under Section 4-209 the bank would have given value to the extent 
that it had a security interest under the preceding section. As the 
District Court judge found that the bank had no notice of the gov-
ernment's claim, it would under the Code have been a holder in due 
course 6 and would thus have been entitled to retain the draft or its 
proceeds as against the government's lien. 
§5.6. Customer's duty to discover and report unauthorized signa-
ture or alteration. Changes in limitations of time are always im-
portant, and this brief discussion of Article 4 may well end with an 
2 The court cited Boston-Continental National Bank v. Hub Fruit Co .• 285 Mass. 
187. 189 N.E. 89 (1934); Grower's Marketing Service, Inc. v. Webster & Atlas 
National Bank, 318 Mass. 496, 62 N.E.2d 225 (1945); Kirstein Leather Co. v. Dietrick, 
86 F.2d 793 (1st Cir. 1936). 
3146 F. Supp. 893, 895 (D. Mass. 1956). 
4 UCC §4-201(1). 
I> Id. §4·208(1)(a), (b). 
6 Id. §3-302. 
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indication of certain changes of this sort. General Laws, c. 107, § 46, 
provides: 
§46. Liability of Bank for Payment of Certain Negotiable 
Instruments, etc. - No bank shall be liable to a depositor, or to 
the drawer of a bilI of exchange upon the bank, for an amount 
charged to or collected from him on account of the payment by 
such bank of a negotiable instrument upon which the signature 
of any party is forged, or which is made, drawn, accepted or en-
dorsed without authority, or which is materially altered; unless 
within one year after the return of such negotiable instrument to 
such depositor or drawer, he shall notify the bank in writing, by 
mail or otherwise, that, as the case may be, the signature of a 
party to the instrument is forged, or that the instrument was 
made, drawn, accepted or endorsed without authority, or that it 
has been materially altered. (1912, 277, § 1.) 1 
Treatment of the forged drawer's signature in the same way as the 
forged endorser's signature may be a hardship on the depositor. He 
is familiar with his own signature and so can distinguish it from a 
forgery; but he may not necessarily be familiar with the signatures 
of a chain of endorsers. Section 4-406 of the Code changes the law of 
Massachusetts by extending the time of the depositor to discover 
forged endorsements, from one year to three years.2 The depositor's 
own unauthorized signature or any alteration on the face or back of 
the item must be discovered in one year. However, the customer may 
find his rights cut off in a much shorter time under Section 4-406 if 
he fails to be reasonably careful and prompt in examining a state-
ment and returned vouchers, and if the bank can show that it lost by 
his negligence.3 And respecting any second or additional forgery by 
the same wrongdoer the depositor has only a "reasonable period not 
exceeding 14 calendar days" under Subsection 2 to discover, and 
notify the bank of, the first unauthorized signature or alteration on a 
returned voucher. Without so notifying the bank, he cannot charge 
it with responsibility for paying after that period on another unau-
thorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer. A lack of 
ordinary care on the part of the bank, however, will reverse this 
result.'l 
§5.6. 1 G.L., c. 107, §46. 
2 UCC §4-406 (4) . 
3 Several opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court state that this is already law 
in Massachusetts. See Grow v. Prudential Trust Co., 249 Mass. 325, 144 N.E. 93 
(1924); Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740, 
22 L.R.A. (N.s.) 250 (1909); Murphy v. Metropolitan National Bank, 191 Mass. 
159, 77 N.E. 693, 114 Am. St. Rep. 595 (1906); Dana v. National Bank of the 
Republic, 132 Mass. 156 (1882). 
4 UCC §4·406 (3). 
/ 
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